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ABSTRACT
The paper sets out a simple monetary model anduses it to compare
alternative monetary systems. Moneymay be either fiat or gold. Both gold
supply and velocity are uncertain. Asset demands are derived fromexpected
utility maximization. I demonstrate the basic argument againsta commodity
money ——thatitwastes resources, show why the optimal growth rate ofmoney
nay be zero, and compare the behavior of the economy underconstantmoney
stock, constant price level, and constant gold price rules.Expected utility






MONETARY RULES AND COMMODITY MONEY SCHEMES TINDERUNCERTAINTY1
Stanley Fischer
Commodity money schemes appeal to deep historical roots and the legend
of a golden age. It is thus inevitable that the call for the gold standard
is heard at times of price level instability. But the argument for a
commodity money faces two fundamental difficulties: anything that commodity
money schemes can accomplish can be done more cheaply in a related fiat money
system2; and commodity money systems have not met the test of survival.
Changes in the relative price of gold have long been recognized as
injecting unnecessary variability into the nominal prices of other
commodities in a simple gold standard system that holds the nominal price of
gold constant. Irving Fisher in 1920, following several earlier economists
whom he credits, proposed that the gold standard be operated with a variable
dollar price of gold such that the dollar price of commodities be maintained
constant. Robert Hall (1982) resuscitated the Fisher scheme, in addition
proposing an alternative commodity standard with few historical antecedents.
In this paper I set out a simple monetary model and use it to analyze
thewelfare economics of alternative monetary systems. Asset demand
functions are obtained from utility maximization, making explicit welfare
calculations possible. The set—up is that o± an overlapping generations
1Department of Economics, MIT, and NBER. Thispaper was prepared for a
special issue of the Journal of Monetary Economics honoring Karl Brunner. I
am grateful to Rudi Dornbusch for helpful discussions. Research support was
provided by the National Science Foundation.
See Fischer (1972), Barro (1979) and Black (1981).model, in which agents can hold gold as as asset and may hold either a gold
or a fiat money. I demonstrate the basic argument against a commodity money
scheme, show why the optimal growth rate of money may be zero rather than the
inverse of the interest rate, and then compare the behavior of the economy
under a money stock rule, a constant price level rule, andamonetary policy
that stabilizes the nominal price of gold: this last is a gold standard with
further discussion of commodity money schemes andmonetaryrules.
Gerald Nickelsburg (1985) andThomasSargent and Neil Wallace (1983)
haveused overlapping generations models to study the welfare economics of
commodity money schemes. Sargent andWallaceconcentrate on the asset rather
thantransactionsrole of money (McCallum, 1983). Nickelsburg addresss
several of thesame issuesas I do in this paper. Our models differ in that
he uses a Glower constraint to generate a demand for money rather than the
transactions cost approach I use, andthathe does not include uncertainty.
I. A Fiat Money System
In the basic model, individuals of generation t are born at t—1 and.
receive an endowment, W1, and perhaps a transfer payment, H1t1, from the
government. They use these resources to invest in physical capital, gold,
and money balances. Capital yields a real return Rt, which may be stochastic
andwhichis assumed independent of other disturbances. Gold holding
provides returns in the formofboth utility andcapitalgains. Money saves
on transactions costs and may yield capital gains or losses.
The utility obtained by generation t is:
(1) TJ( )= (1-'-a)Ct+ln Gt —in
Tt.
Utility is linear in consumption and logarithmic in holdings of gold and intime spent transacting. Transactions time in turn is an increasing function
of consumption and decreasing in real balances:
aC (2) Tt =e(Mxt)
Here is the value of money, the inverse of the price of consumption goods
in ternis of money:
xt
=i/Pt
Strongassumptions such as the functional forms of u( )andT( )aremade for
tractability.
Substitution of (2) in (1) gives the derived utility function:
(3) u( )= C+in + (Mxt)
The coefficient may vary over time. Shifts in y can be regarded as
changes in the transactions techno1ogy. Thether an increase in y increases
or decreases utility depends on the magnitude of MtXt, which will itself be a
function of y.





where Kt is purchases of capital, and Mt are demands for gold and nominal
balances respectively,H1istransfer payments in the form of money made
to individualsinthefirstperiodof life, and isthe real (in terms of









are transfer payments in the form of money made to individuals in. the
3Linearity of the utility function in consumption ensures that the demand
functions for assets are dominated by expected rates of return rather than
expectations of the marginal utility of consumption.
1Uncertainty about the transactions technology could also affect a. This
would have more pervasive effects on portfolio decisions in period t—1 than
does uncertainty about y.—4--
second period of life.
With Rt, and X uncertain, the individual maximizes expected utility,
First order conditions are:
(6) - Rq1I÷ =
t-[xt-RtXti]
÷ _____=
whereexpressions of the form indicate the expectation at (t—i) of Z..
Rewriting (6) and (7) in the form of demand functions:





The absence of scale effects from the demand function is a result of the
constancy of the marginal utility of consumption, in part due to the
separability of consumption and real balances in the transactions cost
function.
In equilibrium and are each equal to the respective supplies of
the assets. Because changes in the net supply of gold are assumed to come
from outside the economy, (Gt —Gti)does not appear in the budget
constraints (4) and (5). Assuming that Rt is independently and identically
distributed, t_iRt =Rfor all t. Then (6)' and (7)' give the asset pricing
relationships:






1 r __ (10) =—fl-- L 'T G R
1 V 1 1t+i—1 Tt+i 11jXti
—L T t—1M oR t+i
Theprice of gold will fluctuate over time if the stock of gold fluctuates;
the absoluteprice level fluctuates because ofboth technological shocks and
changesinthe stock of money.
Substitution of the demand functions (6)' and (7)', and thebudget
constraints(4) and (5) in the utility function (3) gives expected utility in




+in + inMt + inX)
II. A Commodity Money System
In the pure commodity money system, gold serves instead of fiatmoney.
The iuaxiraand is now:
(13)E(Ct +in +in(Qm
where is the non—monetary gold stock and Gm the monetary gold stock.—0—
Goldcan be transformed costlessly from one form to the other by the young,
butmonetary gold cannot simultaneously be held indirectly utility—yielding






Maximizationof expected utility gives:











(17) =LL G oR t+i
with gold as numeraire, is the inverse of the general price level, which
now shifts in accordance with changes in both the supply of gold and the
transactions technology.
Expected utility in the commodity money system is:
(18) t_1UG(t) =RWt1
- — ÷(+ in
+in ÷ in +(y
in
In the next section we compare expected utility in the fiat and commodity
money systems.—7-
III.The Basic Case Against a Commodity Money
The basic case against a commodity money is that fiat money is cheaper
to produce. The point is seen most clearly by assuming the stocks of gold












Inthe commodity money system, by contrast:
I (21)_1=q=—
The value of the gold stock will be higher in the commodity money system:
indeed for the unitary elastic demands generated by the underlying utility
function the value of gold in the commodity system is exactly equal to the
value o± money and gold in the fiat system. But that increase in value is
insufficient to compensate for the loss of gold as a commodity. The utility





The loss in utility is higher, the larger the proportion of gold stock
that is used as money, that is, the higher is y. Although costs of-8—
production are not formally included in the model, the utility loss from
using a commodity money is equivalent to the loss caused by the diversion of
factors of production to gold mining.
IV. The Optimum Quantity of Money
Continuing to assume away the presence of uncertainty, we examine the
optimumquantityof money argument in the fiat money model. Since gold is in
this model entirely separable, we assume for this section that capital and









where Hti1 and Ht12 are nominal transfer payments to the young and old,
respectively.
In equilibrium in this stationary economy the value of money will be




(24) MX -MX -I
00tt
Obviously as the growth rate of money falls, equilibrium holdings of
real balances increase. As the growth rate of money approaches the negative
of the real interest rate, real balances approach infinity. However, it is—9—
riotnecessarily optimal to drive real balances to infinity, for as real
balances rise, capital accumulation is affected (Drazen (1979)).
To see this, assume all transfer payments are made to theyoung. Then,
generation t's utility is:
=





This derivative is zero when the growth rate of money is zero andutility is
t accordingly at a maximum
2 0< 0) whenis zero.
OL
The optimum quantity result does not hold because capital accumulation
is reduced by the first period lump sumtaxes.Capital accumulation is equal
to
= +RpMtiXti -Mtxti
that is, the endowment plus transfer payments minus the amount of endowment
used up in purchasing real balances.
Thus,





Reductionsin the growth rate of money reduce capital accumulation.
There is of course the benefit that the value of real balances increases,
providing more utility, but in this case the two effects exactly balance when
the growth rate of money is zero.-10-
It shouldaccordingly be expected that utility will rise when the growth







Itis certainly optimal to reduce the growth rate of money below zero. But




whichexceeds the optimum quantity formula
r
It is optimal to stop short of satiating the economy with cash balances to
ensure that not too much capital is displaced.
V.Stabilizing the Price Level
We now restore uncertainty and examine alternative monetary rules,
starting with a price stabilization rule. Whether it is optimal to stabilize
the price level depends on the stochastic properties of -y. We continue to
omit gold. Now assume first that,
(27) =y(1+ c> —1
where is a white noise process. The specification (27) implies that each
generation knows its own technology shock, and thus velocity, when it makes
its portfolio decisions.
With y described by (27), and a constant money stock, M,—11—
(28) x1=1 1+ti
The price level is proportional to the money stock and fluctuates inversely
with Jensen's inequality implies that the expected price level rises
with the variance of €,butit is clear that the behavior of X, the value of
money, is the relevant concern. With the value of money expected to return
to its mean, the expected rate of inflation is higher when is high and
vice versa.
With r1stochastic,the expected utility of generation t is (again
ignoring gold), from (1 2):
(29) t_i5(t)= RWt_i+(ln + yt[t11n(! ÷
Uncertainty about the future price level therefore reduces the welfare of
generation t compared with a situation in which there are no shocks to y.
Constant M corresponds here to an inactive monetary policy.
Now consider a monetary policy that completely stabilizes the price
level. The simplest such policy is
(30) =
whichaccomodates the quantity of money to the quantity demanded. Then,
(31) x=
andthe price level is completely stable. Taking into account the transfer
payments thathaveto be made, expected utility for generation t is:
(32) _1Upp(t) =RW_1
+ — —+ Y1n1ytin r
where is utility when prices are fixed.
The difference between utility under a constant price level and a





The difference depends on the realizations of and t—2As a base case
assume =t-2
=0.In that case generation t would prefer next period's
price level to be stabilized. If the realization of ishigh, then again
generation t—1 would prefer the prospect of a stable price level. But if
is low, this generation suffers negative transfer payments under the
fixed price rule and loses its expected capital gains on money because prices
are being stabilized. Such a generation would prefer a stable money stock.
Of course, it is only for analytic convenience that each period is
assumed to be a generation long. Although not strictly accurate, we may
rather think of.each individual as living through many periods, with his or
her expected utility independent of conditions in any particular period:
that would suggest as a welfare criterion the expectation of utility taken
sufficiently far back in time that generation t has no special information on
which to judge its prospects. For the stochastic technology, (27), that
comparison could be made at period t—3. In this case the fixed price rule,
which implies zero expected transfers, would be preferred.
The result that uncertainty about makes individuals worse off is,
surprisingly, not robust. Two examples make the point. Suppose first that
y(1 +c)
so that generation t does not know the value of at the time it makes its
portfolio decisions. Then is constant, independent of c (because it is
the demand of the young generation that determines the value of money) and
expected utility will be unaffected by the uncertainty.
Alternately, suppose that—13—
(34) y =y(i+ +
with once again i.i.d., which implies
()x1 = +t1)




= RWti+ yi l(y(1÷Et÷ec1)1n(! +
Fordiscussion purposes suppose =0.Then if 9 is positive,
uncertainty about is likely to increase the expected utility of the t'th
generation. When is high, leading the t'th generation to put a high value
on real balances, the value of money tends to be high. And because the last
expectation in (36) is convex in for 9 > 0, the uncertainty makes
individuals better off than they would be if were identically zero.
Given (35) as the process fory, and once again setting = the
value of money would be constant at l/r, and the difference inutility
between the fixed price and fixed money rules is:
- _1U(t)'=(_— E) +
1+9c
t_i 1+9rct )]
Fora given value of and with 9 positive, this tends to be negative.
Thus with 9 positive the fixed quantity role outperforms the fixedprice rule
from the viewpoint of generation t at time t—1. The reason is the convexity
of the utility function in for 9 > 0.
Interestingly, though, generation (t—i) might well prefer a fixed price-14-
rule before it iiows the value of .Thedifference betwen the expected
utilities under the two rules taken at t—3 is equal to
3[y(1÷ec1)ln(1+ec1) -y(1+Et)ln(1+R
For e close to or larger than one (e is not limited to be less than i) this
expression is positive. Thus ex ante a fixed price rule may be preferred,
but once some uncertainty has been resolved, the fixed money rule may appear
preferable.
At this stage of course it would be desirable to have in the model more
pervasive effects of monetary uncertainty than merely on the demand for
money. In particular, price level variability induces variability in both
the level of output and its allocation, because of the slow adjustment of
prices.5 A heavier penalty on price level variability, equivalent in this
model to ex ante uncertainty about prices, would of course make the fixed
price rule more attractive relative to the fixed money rule. Despite the
above interesting result that price level uncertainty may increase expected
utility under certain conditions, the presumption should still be in the
opposite direction.
VI. Stabilizing the Nominal Price of Gold
Section II showed why the use of a commodity as money is typically
-
dominatedby use of a fiat money. The nominal price of gold can be
stabilized by using it as money or by manipulating the money stock for that
purpose. This is what Black (1981) means by a gold standard with zero
reserves. We now return to the full model with gold and fiat money,
starting, by describing the behavior of the gold stock.
5Such effects are discussed in Brunner and Meltzer (1971).—15—
(38) Gt =____
whereu is a white noise process u>—1. The gold stock follows
approximately a logarithmic random walk.
From the pricing equation for gold, (10), we obtain
=
Theprice of gold in terms of commodities thus varies over time with the
supply. From equation (3) it is clear that the uncertainty in the supply of
gold reduces expected utility; the price uncertainty when gold is merely a
commodity is derivative of the quantity uncertainty and exerts no independent
effects on utility.
Suppose now that monetary policy instead of being passive or stabilizing
the aggregate price level aims to stabilize the exchange rate between money
and gold, the nominal price of gold. Let be the nominal price of gold:
=
Monetarypolicy now has to stabilize at Q, or to set
(40) x=—-.
For convenience we set Q =1.We thus want the monetary policy such that
= Notethat no gold is being used for monetary purposes.
The policy will have to depend on the stochastic structure of both
and Assume that is given by (27). We require







forall t will produce constancy in the nominal price of gold.6
The rule is to expand the money stock with the gold stock, the
proportion depending on the technology parameter t— When the demand for
money at any given expected rate of inflation is high (i.e. when
large)the money stock is larger. Essentially (41) is a simple accommodating
policy, combining rule (30) that stabilizes the price level with a policy
that mimics the movements in the gold stock.







t+ 1 + 1n+ 1 r
Comparing (42) with (29), adjusting for the omission of terms inin (29),
the gold standard policy appears preferable for =
C_2U SO long as
the variance of u is small compared with that of Furthercomparison with
(32), however, shows that a policy of stabilizing the price level is likely
to produce greater expected utility than gold price stabilization. Viewed at
least three periods ahead, price level stabilization dominates gold price
stabilization.
6 essential assumption in deriving (41) is thatUt fl (38) is not serially
correlated.
7Between (29) and(42),note that (Et/R) in the former is replaced by
(ut÷l/r) in the latter. The difference results from the fact that shocks to
G are permanent and those to y are transitory.-17—
This analysis provides no support for the gold standard rule-keepthe
nominal price of gold constant —formonetary policy. It is possible though
that correlation betweenu÷i and couldmake a case for the gold
standard. If the gold stock was expected to be high when was high, then
following the gold standard rule would be utility increasing.
However, there is no reason to expect such a correlation.
VII. OMITTED FACTORS.
One benefit of commodity reserve money schemes not included in theabove
analysis is that they operate automatically. In this paper the monetary
authority is able to fix the price level exactly. It can also determine the
price of gold exactly by changing the stock of money, Of course these feats
are not possible in practice.
The inability of the monetary authority to achieve its targetsexactly
could be included in the above model by assuming that themoney stock
deviates randomly from the level of the base set by themonetary authority.
This would not materially affect the comparisonamongthedifferent fiat
money schemes, including the constant growth rate rule.
It would however affect the comparison between schemes that involve
fixing the q.uantity of money and those that endogenize money, such as
interest rate fixing or commodity reserve schemes. There are three issues in
the commodity reserve schemes. Beyond the resource costs of such schemes and
the problem of changing relative prices of the commodities and goods in
general —bothanalyzed above —afull comparison would have to include the
possible breakdown of the scheme. As Flood and Garber (1985) have
emphasized, a scheme that produces intermittent absolute stability punctuated
by breakdowns may be worse than one that produces less short run stability-18-
but is more likely to survive.
The Irving Fisher gold standard with variable nominal price of gold is a
commodity money scheme that attempts to stabilize the price level. It would
thus achieve the same price level behavior as the monetary policy of Section
V. s a commodity money system, the Fisher plan has the advantage over the
normal gold standard of being much less likely to break down because of
secular changes in the relative price of gold. It has the disadvantage that
lags in price data collection make it less automatic ——andmore likely to be
the subject of speculative attacks ——than a pure gold standard scheme.
Further, as Section V shows, the price level can be stabilized through
monetary policy without having to hold reserves of gold. The benefits of the
Fisher scheme would then result from its automaticity and the possibility ——
thoughnot the likelihood ——thatits operation is easier to enforce than
that of a monetary policy not tied to a commodity reserve that is given the
goal of price level stabilization.8
VIII. Summary
Commodity money systems are dominated by related fiat money systems.
The positive case for a genuine commodity money would have to be constructed
by arguing that their autornaticity ensures better implementation of the goals
of policy than would be achieved under the superior fiat system. That issue
has not been analyzed in this paper, but it is doubtful the case can be made
once it is recognized that commodity schemes have always broken down.
The paper also addresses the issue of the choice between fixed money
stock and fixed price level rules, is an equilibrium economy. The former is
typically though not always less desirable than the latter. A fixed money
8Nickelsburg (1985) is skeptical about the viability of the Fisher
scheme.—19—
(growth) rule does in practice have the benefit that it isrelatively easy to
monitor andthatblameforinevitable divergences from targets can be
assigned. Since the monetary authority has less control over the price
level, it can more easily escape detection if it misbehaves undera price
level rule. That is one of several reasonsmany economists have given for
preference, a money stock rule. But it is an extremelypoor reason.
Academics, Karl Brunner among them, have analyzed central banks as
maximizing institutions, whose preference for obscurity ofpurpose and
methods maximizes the easy life. The academic analysis ofpolicy that
insists on simple criteria for policy evaluationmay also be seen as a
iaaxiiuizing choice, which minimizes the amount of time that academics have to
spend evaluating policy and the small details of institutional change that
central bankers us to justify their actions.
In this regardKarl Brunner hasset an example, in both analyzing
generalprinciples of monetary policy and——throughthe Shadow Open Narket
Committee, hisown research,andin advisingUnited States andEuropean
policy-makers——willinglyimmersinghimself in the details ofpolicy
implementation. For himeconomicshasbeenboth intellectual stimulation and
a tool to tryto improve the world.-20-
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